James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery

12-20-1997

DDASaccident020
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident020" (1997). Global CWD Repository. 220.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/220

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 22/01/2004

Accident number: 20

Accident time: 09:55

Accident Date: 20/12/1997

Where it occurred: Sabie, Moamba
District, Maputo
Province

Country: Mozambique

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 30/01/1998

ID original source: IND 000136

Name of source: CND/IND/MCHM

Organisation: MECHEM
Mine/device: PMD-6 AP blast

Ground condition: hard

Date record created: 12/01/2004

Date last modified: 22/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 4

Map details
Longitude: 32° 15' 26" E

Latitude: 25° 18' 44" S

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate communications (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
vegetation clearance problem (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
use of pick (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
A report on the accident prepared for the National authority was made available in November
2000. Made available in English, the following summarises its content.
The group were engaged in following up manually a mechanical clearance made with steelwheeled vehicles.
The victim was a site supervisor (South African with EOD and bomb disposal background).
He was born on 3rd April 1954.
The base camp was 17 Km from the demining site. The site had grass 50cm tall, small
bushes and ground compacted by the Casspir vehicles during their mechanical "clearance". A
large number of PMD-6 mines were found in the area after the Casspirs had passed. These
mines were close to the surface and "partly visible".
Using a MineLab detector a deminer found a PMD-6 in his lane and called the victim who
helped him start a new lane adjacent to the first. The group's SOPs allowed for detonation at
the end of the working day.
When the deminer came alongside the first mine, he located another, and called the victim
again. The victim decided to prepare the mines for destruction, took the deminer's "spade"
and sent him away. When the deminer reached the safe area the detonation occurred at
09:55.
The local Team Leader tried to make radio contact with his base unsuccessfully. The victim
was put on a stretcher and carried in the Casspir vehicle to the base where the paramedic
was situated. First medical attention was 15 minutes after the accident. An air CASEVAC was
ordered and the helicopter left at 11:15 for Nelspruit Hospital, arriving at 12:15.

The deminer stated that the victim has taken his small hoe (enxada) just before the accident.
The victim later stated that he was "in the process of preparing the mine" when the accident
occurred.

The picture above shows the remains of the victim’s peaked cap and spectacles after the
blast. His standard prescription spectacles were believed to have provided some eye
protection.

Conclusion
The investigators determined that the accident showed that "mechanical clearance by the
help of steel wheeled Casspirs needs an efficient control after it". The mines and detonators
"can" still be functional. The real reason for the mine's detonation was unknown. "The used
charges include a hidden danger for the person placing them on the mine".

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the demining group's procedures for detonating mines
after mechanical preparation be reviewed. They also recommended that the paramedic
should be on site during clearance and that training should include first-aid/CASEVAC
instruction for all personnel at least once every three months.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 33

Name: Name removed

Age: 43

Gender: Male

Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 2 hours 20 minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
minor Eyes
minor Hearing
severe Arm
severe Chest
severe Eye
severe Face
severe Head
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Arm Above elbow
Leg Above knee
COMMENT: See medical report.

Medical report
A Casualty report in the accident file stated that the victim had received severe trauma of his
left arm and left leg, and "face burns". He arrived at Nelspruit hospital at 12:15 after air
CASEVAC.

"Nature of injury
L/L under patella blew 90% off
L/U/A blown off completely
Facial burns 20% (partial thickness)
L/Ear badly burned by explosive
Lacerations on face and R/arm
Injust to L/Eye (semi dilated pupil and Heamatoma)
Vital signs - BP 100/60 Pulse 60
Respiration - shallow
Glascow Coma Scale - 11 15
Patient in terrible pain and in hypvdemic shock
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RX to patient
Patient on scoop supine
ABS done
Primary and secondary survey done.
Stopped bleeding by use of three methods will explain if needed. There was a great loss of
hema due to injuries causing it difficult to set up IV lines, cut away was done and fluid
replacement took its way.
Airway management was monitored all the time.
All injury to patient was RX to perfection,

Equipment and medicines used
6
x
No.6 Trauma bandages
6

x

No.5 Trauma bandages

10

x

Conforming bandages

1

x

Ferna full leg blow up splint

2

x

Pkt of gauze

2

x

Ringers

2

x

Heamcell

2

x

18g canula

2

x

15ml dropper

1

x

strapper oil

O'8 litres per min giving
200mg pethidine Im IV over 20 25 mins
1

x

ET 7.5

1

x

T piece

1

x

Large magils

Dormicum IV 20ml
1

x

cather+bag

Patient stable and ready for casevac 11:15.
The victim later stated that he regained consciousness on 26th December 1997 in hospital.
His left arm was amputated 15cm from the shoulder and his left leg above his knee. He
sustained "severe burns" on his face and chest. His face, chest and right arm "were lacerated
with shrapnel". He also "sustained minor fractures of the skull". On the 8th January 1998
when the statement was made he was also suffering from double vision and deafness.
Interviewed in March 2001, the victim was using a lower leg prosthetic that allowed him to
drive, and was working for the same demining company in a field management capacity. He
was adept at using the stump of his left arm to clamp things against his side and to “oppose”
his hand. Cheerful and sociable, he reported that his eyesight had been affected, but that his
spectacles compensated. His hearing was noticeably poor.
He mentioned that he had been wearing a back-support following a strain injury and this
protected his body during the blast.
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Analysis
The victim did not leave the lane after confirming the presence of the second mine. Unless he
was carrying explosives and detonators with him, he did not have an explosive charge to
place beside the mine. From this I infer that he was "preparing" the mine for detonation by
excavating alongside it, and so the accident is classed as an "Excavation accident". It is
possible that he was examining the mines to see why they had not been detonated with the
steel-wheels.
The primary cause of the accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the victim
slipped while going about his work, which would be an unavoidable human error. If he tripped
on the uncut grass, that would illustrate a failing in the area preparation.
The secondary cause of the accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy”
because there were inadequate communications and Medevac facilities at the site. It could be
argued that the steel wheel preparation had also been inadequate and made the risk of injury
more likely.

Related papers
An internal demining group memorandum was included in the file. This stated that at 09:55
the victim slipped and detonated a PMD-6 with his "left side". The paramedic met the victim
half way to the base site and he was carried "by Toyota" to the base for air CASEVAC. At
10:09 a cellular phone was used to notify the group's management that they had a "Priority 1"
accident.
At 10:40 the helicopter arrived and the patient received "aviation protocol medicine and
cauterisation".
A sketch map of the site (on lined paper) was on file.
Photographs of the site showed that the deminers were not cutting the grass as they
advanced because the grass in the taped lanes was no different from that in the surrounding
areas.
The victim was interviewed in May 2001 while he was at work with the demining group. He
was cheerful and willing to speak about the accident. He confirmed that he tripped on
undergrowth and fell after preparing a mine for detonation. He landed with his hand on a
second mine. His arm and his knee were close together as he fell.
At the time of the interview the victim was using a prosthetic leg with skill. He retained a
stump of arm (10-15cm) that he was able to utilise. He drove a car and led a full working and
social life.
It was noted that his hearing was poor, and he confirmed this. He also confirmed some loss of
vision in one eye as a result of the accident. When asked, he acknowledged some breathing
difficulties after the accident.
The victim stressed that protective equipment was available but that he chose not to wear it –
believing that it served little purpose in the event of an accident.

Statements
Statement 1 - witness
A statement from the deminer who found the mine indicated that he marked the first mine and
was told to mark it and continue beyond it, which he did. When he had finished the lane he
moved his markers with help from the victim. When he found the second mine he placed a
marker and called the supervisor again. Both mines were visible [so did not need excavating].
The supervisor asked for his enxada (hoe) and sent him to the safe area. When the mine
exploded the deminer and his partner loaded the victim into the car and drove towards the
“hospital”.
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Statement 2 – victim
The victim stated that:
“One of the team members located a mine and reported it to me. I moved to the mine, marked
it and was in the process of preparing the mine for countermining with an explosive charge.
There was an explosion and I cannot remember anything further.
I regained consciousness on 26th December 1997 and was informed that I was in Nelspruit
Private Hospital. My left arm was amputated 150mm below the shoulder and my left leg
above the knee. I further sustained severe burns in my face and on my chest. My face, chest
and right arm were lacerated with shrapnel. I also sustained minor fractures of the scull.
At present I am suffering from double vision as well as deafness.”
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